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Abstract
Background: On 20–21 February 2006, six cases of diarrhoea-associated haemolytic uraemic
syndrome (HUS) were reported by paediatricians to the Norwegian Institute of Public Health. We
initiated an investigation to identify the etiologic agent and determine the source of the outbreak
in order to implement control measures.
Methods: A case was defined as a child with diarrhoea-associated HUS or any person with an
infection with the outbreak strain of E. coli O103 (defined by the multi-locus variable number
tandem repeats analysis (MLVA) profile) both with illness onset after January 1st 2006 in Norway.
After initial hypotheses-generating interviews, we performed a case-control study with the first
fifteen cases and three controls for each case matched by age, sex and municipality. Suspected food
items were sampled, and any E. coli O103 strains were typed by MLVA.
Results: Between 20 February and 6 April 2006, 17 cases were identified, of which 10 children
developed HUS, including one fatal case. After pilot interviews, a matched case-control study was
performed indicating an association between a traditional cured sausage (odds ratio 19.4 (95% CI:
2.4–156)) and STEC infection. E. coli O103:H25 identical to the outbreak strain defined by MLVA
profile was found in the product and traced back to contaminated mutton.
Conclusion: We report an outbreak caused by a rare STEC variant (O103:H25, stx2-positive).
More than half of the diagnosed patients developed HUS, indicating that the causative organism is
particularly virulent. Small ruminants continue to be important reservoirs for human-pathogen
STEC. Improved slaughtering hygiene and good manufacturing practices for cured sausage products
are needed to minimise the possibility of STEC surviving through the entire sausage production
process.
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Background
Shiga toxin producing E. coli (STEC) can cause bloody
diarrhoea which in 2–15% of cases, particularly in chil-
dren, develop into haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS)
which can lead to renal failure and death [1]. More than
90% of diarrhoea-associated HUS cases are due to STEC
infections. Routine diagnosis and surveillance of STEC-
infections was originally developed for serotype O157:H7
of STEC. However, non-O157 E. coli infections are in cer-
tain geographic regions considered to be at least equally
important, but may in general be underdiagnosed [2].
Sporadic STEC infections may be transmitted through
food, contact with animals or farming environments or by
person-to-person, the last two affecting mainly young
children [3]. Outbreaks are mainly foodborne, and have
been associated with a wide variety of products, including
undercooked minced beef, unpasteurized milk or apple
juice, yoghurt, cheese, lettuce, vegetables, cured sausages
and drinking water [1].
In Norway (population 4.6 million), around 10 to 20
cases of sporadic STEC infection are notified annually.
Most have only bloody diarrhoea [4], and approximately
half have been acquired in Norway. The only documented
foodborne STEC outbreak in Norway occurred in 1999
with four confirmed cases of E. coli O157:H7 infection,
most likely caused by contaminated domestically pro-
duced lettuce [5].
On 20–21 February 2006, a cluster of four diarrhoea-asso-
ciated HUS cases was reported to the Norwegian Institute
of Public Health (NIPH) from an academic hospital in
Oslo. Enquiries to other hospitals in Norway identified
two additional HUS cases diagnosed since the beginning
of 2006. Since hospital episode statistics indicate less than
a handful HUS cases in children per year in Norway, we
suspected an outbreak and launched an investigation in
order to identify the source and stop the outbreak.
Methods
Epidemiological investigation
Case definition and case finding
For the outbreak investigation we defined an outbreak-
related case as a child less than 16 years old, hospitalised
in Norway with diarrhoea-associated HUS or a person of
any age with an infection with the outbreak strain of E. coli
O103 (defined by a specific multi-locus variable number
tandem repeats analysis (MLVA) profile), both with onset
after January 1, 2006. We alerted all medical microbio-
logical laboratories and clinicians, in particular paediatric
nephrologists, of the outbreak and requested rapid report-
ing of suspected cases.
Hypotheses-generating interviews
We interviewed all cases (or, if <16 years of age, their par-
ents) in person or by phone with our standard 14-paged
structured hypothesis-generating questionnaire covering
clinical symptoms, demographics, food and drinks con-
sumed, animal contacts and environmental exposures in
the seven days preceding onset of diarrhoea. Most cases
were contacted repeatedly to obtain a complete picture of
their exposures. Local public health doctors or district
food safety authorities interviewed school and kindergar-
ten staff regarding foods eaten by cases in these locations
and forwarded the data to the NIPH.
Case-control study
The case-control study started on February 22 and
included all cases reported to the NIPH. The study was
designed to measure association between disease and con-
sumption of 26 food items that were suspected based on
the hypothesis-generating interviews, including several
types of meat, dairy products and vegetables, some of
which were specified with brand names. Three controls
per case were randomly selected from the computerised
national population register matched by (closest) date of
birth, gender and municipality of residence. For the cases,
consumption of food items was asked for the period of
one week before the onset of diarrhoea; the matched con-
trols answered for the corresponding period. Controls
that had travelled abroad during this period, or that did
not speak Norwegian were excluded. Trained personnel
interviewed cases and controls by telephone.
On February 24, with data from the first 6 cases and their
18 matched controls, the analysis indicated minced meat
of brand A as the source. We reported this to the National
Food Safety Authority (NFSA) and then continued the
investigation. On March 14, when case number 11 was
confirmed, hypothesis-generating interviews led us to sus-
pect another product. We then extended the case-control
questionnaire to include this product and interviewed all
cases and controls also with the revised questionnaire.
The second analysis of the case-control data included fif-
teen cases known by March 17. Results were reported on
March 20 to the NFSA.
Statistical analysis
Interview data were entered in Microsoft Office Excel
2003. Answers were coded 'yes', 'no' or 'unknown'.
Unknown was coded as missing in the analysis. The
descriptive analysis and the conditional logistic regression
models were performed in STATA 9.2 (Stata Corporation,
College Station, TX, USA). Bivariate conditional regres-
sion analyses were initially run for all exposures using
Wald chi-square test for significance. Risk factors with a p-
value <0.2 were included in a multivariate conditional
logistic regression model. Only factors to which moreBMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:41 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/41
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than half of the cases had been exposed, were considered
in the model. We removed from the model one exposure
at a time using the Wald p-value <0.1 as the elimination
criterion. The results are reported as matched odds ratios
(mORs) with 95% confidence intervals and two-tailed
Wald p-values for the regression coefficients. Because of
the small numbers of subjects in the first case-control
study, it was not possible to obtain a conditional maxi-
mum-likelihood estimate of the odds ratio for all expo-
sures. For these exposures, we calculated the median
unbiased estimate (MUE) of the odds ratio and exact 95%
confidence intervals using LogXact 4 (Cytel Software Cor-
poration, Cambridge, MA, USA).
Ethical considerations
The National Committees for Research Ethics in Norway
consider outbreak investigations as public health practice,
and approval by the research ethical committee is not
needed as long as the objective is to control the outbreak
(this is in line with the 1991 International Guidelines for
Ethical Review of Epidemiological Studies by the Council
for International Organisations of Medical Sciences).
Ooutbreak investigations follow the regulations on
patient privacy and protection as stated in the Norwegian
Law on Communicable Disease Control.
Microbiological and environmental investigation
Patients
Initial isolation of STEC from stool samples was
attempted at the primary diagnostic laboratories. Because
several of these laboratories routinely only test for E. coli
O157 using sorbitol MacConkey's (SMAC)-agar, they
were early on instructed to examine also for E. coli O103
or refer suspect samples or strains to an expert laboratory.
All suspected STEC isolates were sent to NIPH for verifica-
tion, DNA-profiling by MLVA [6] and examination of vir-
ulence factors, including the genes eae, stx1and stx2, using
an octaplex PCR [7]. This PCR method was also imple-
mented to screen multiple colonies from mixed cultures.
Isolates which tested positive for eae, stx or both, were
examined further for serotype affiliation and MLVA pro-
file. Since it was observed that the outbreak strain dis-
played a distinct morphology on Chromocult coliform
agar (Chromocult; Merck, UK) [8], this medium was also
used to select suspect colonies from mixed cultures.
The Stx2 toxin was subtyped according to the scheme pro-
posed by Persson et al. [9] by full sequencing of the stxAB2
operon. A few strains were also sent to the WHO
Escherichia reference centre at State Serum Institute in
Denmark for verification and further characterization.
After an initial Widal agglutination test performed at the
NIPH, available sera from cases were sent to the German
HUS reference laboratory at the Münster University Clinic
to perform IgM/IgG immunoblot assays against sero-
group O103 and other important HUS-associated sero-
groups.
Food-products and production sites
The NFSA collected leftover food items from patients'
homes and products from shops of purchase. The NFSA
also traced the suspected products and their ingredients,
sampled raw materials and ingredients and inspected and
sampled the producers' premises. Brand labels and batch
numbers of items were checked. Samples were tested for
the presence of STEC O103 at the Norwegian School of
Veterinary Science using modifications of two methods
(methods no. 125 and 164) suggested by the Nordic
Committee on Food Analysis [10], including automated
immunomagnetic separation specific for E. coli O103
(Dynabeads STEC/VTEC O103; Invitrogen Corp., Oslo,
Norway). Presumptive STEC O103 isolates from the
immunomagnetic separation procedure which showed
the distinct colony morphology on Chromocult coliform
agar [8], were sent to the NIPH for confirmation, virulence
factor testing and MLVA typing as specified above.
Results
Epidemiologic investigation
Case finding
Between February 20 and April 7, 2006, 17 cases were
identified: 10 cases of HUS, six cases of diarrhoea and one
asymptomatic case (who was the mother of a HUS case).
All 10 HUS cases and four diarrhoea cases were hospital-
ised. One HUS patient died within five days after hospital-
isation. Sixteen cases had diarrhoea of which 14 had
bloody diarrhoea. Two cases also reported haematuria.
Dates of symptom onset ranged between January 22 and
March 13, 2006, with 15 cases reporting first symptoms
between February 12 and March 13 (Figure 1). Ten cases
came from mid-Norway, in two neighbouring counties.
Among the other cases residing in seven other counties
(Figure 2), one had visited one of the first counties the
week before illness. Eleven (65%) cases were female, and
all cases were children aged 1–11 years, except the asymp-
tomatic case (aged 40) and another adult (aged 18) with
diarrhoea only. All HUS cases were less than 9 years old.
Hypothesis-generating (pilot) interviews
The interviews of the first six HUS cases were completed
on February 22 and revealed no recent travel history, or
common exposures to restaurants, events or animal con-
tact. However, some food products were commonly men-
tioned, including minced meat of one specific brand. By
March 14, an additional five cases had been notified. Con-
tinued hypothesis-generating interviews with these new
cases identified another common exposure; a traditional
cured sausage product called 'morrpølse'. This productBMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:41 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/41
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had been mentioned by only one of the first six patients.
However, repeated interviews with the patients' parents
specifically asking about possible exposure to this sausage
product by visiting friends, relatives or at other places,
found that this product could be linked to all cases except
one.
Case-control study
In the first case-control study, all six HUS cases and six of
18 matched controls had eaten minced beef from pro-
ducer A (OR = 8.5 p = 0.04). At this stage in the investiga-
tion no pathogen was identified in the six HUS cases. The
second case control study including all 15 cases known to
us at that time and their 45 matched controls identified
several meat products to be associated with illness (Table
1). In the final multivariable model, only the consump-
tion of traditional cured sausage ("morrpølse") and eating
beefburger at a fast-food restaurant of chain B were inde-
pendently associated with illness (Table 1).
Microbiological and environmental investigation
Patients
Stool or serum specimens were obtained from all 17 cases
(Table 2). Nine of the ten HUS cases were confirmed as
having an E. coli O103 infection, using either stool sample
culture (four cases) or serology (five cases). One HUS case
had negative results for serogroup O103 by both meth-
ods, but was positive with LPS IgM serology for E. coli
O157. Six cases with diarrhoea and one asymptomatic
family contact had a positive stool sample for E. coli
O103. The serotype of the outbreak strain was identified
as E. coli O103:H25. All eleven patient isolates were posi-
tive for the eae-gene (intimin encoding), but Shiga toxin
genes could be detected in only two isolates, both with
Shiga toxin 2 only. By sequencing, the outbreak strain was
allocated to subtype Stx2-O157-EDL933 according to the
subtyping scheme suggested by Persson et al. [9]. The
patients concerned developed HUS. All outbreak isolates,
irrespective of their stx-status, belonged to the same
MLVA-profile cluster, which were markedly different from
the collection of 106 other E. coli O103 isolates at the
NIPH except for two strains from HUS patients diagnosed
in 2003 and 2005 respectively. A dendrogram comparing
the isolates from the present outbreak with epidemiolog-
ically unrelated O103 strains has been presented previ-
ously by Linstedt et al. [6].
Food-products and production sites
Two days after the product recall, E. coli O103 with the
outbreak MLVA-profile was isolated in unopened pack-
ages of the recalled cured "morrpølse". This product was
produced only in facility A which had distributed 3.5
tonnes nationwide between December 2005 and March
20, 2006. The sausage contains mutton and pork in addi-
tion to starter culture, spices and preservatives. The curing
process takes approximately three weeks. Low pH, low
water activity and an added bacterial culture are the main
barriers against pathogen growth. No heat treatment is
included in the production process. Among the different
ingredients of the incriminated sausage, E. coli with the
distinct characteristics of the outbreak strain was only
recovered from mutton.
From facility A, the outbreak strain was also traced to pro-
duction plant B (frozen mutton), then to slaughterhouse
C (mutton) and then to four farms (sheep).
Public health action
On February 24, based on our first report, the NFSA issued
a public warning against minced beef from producer A
Distribution of cases of haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS) and E. coli O103 infection by week of onset of symptoms, Nor- way, January-March 2006 (n = 16) Figure 1
Distribution of cases of haemolytic uraemic syndrome (HUS) and E. coli O103 infection by week of onset of 
symptoms, Norway, January-March 2006 (n = 16).
6 Outbreak alert 
5 HUS case, confirmed E. coli  O103 
4 HUS case, suspected E. coli  O103
3 (Bloody) diahrrea, confirmed E. coli O103 
2
1
12   3456789 1 0 1 1   12 13 14 
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Distribution of outbreak related cases of HUS and E. coli O103 infection by county, Norway, January-March 2006 (n = 17) Figure 2
Distribution of outbreak related cases of HUS and E. coli O103 infection by county, Norway, January-March 
2006 (n = 17).BMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:41 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/41
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and the producer withdrew all minced beef from the pro-
duction facility they believed to be the origin of the sus-
pected food based on the geographical distribution of the
cases. The importance of good kitchen hygiene and proper
cooking of minced meat was stressed by health authori-
ties.
On March 20, based on the extended case-control study,
the NFSA withdrew the incriminated cured sausages
("morrpølse") from the market and warned the public
against eating these products produced between Decem-
ber 1, 2005 and March 20, 2006. The production facility
A was closed, and then cleaned and inspected before pro-
duction could resume. Sheep slaughtering techniques
were changed to reduce contamination.
Discussion
We have reported an outbreak of haemolytic uremic syn-
drome caused by a highly virulent strain of Shiga toxin 2
producing  E. coli O103:H25. Dry cured sausages were
identified as the vehicle of infection, as evidenced by
results of a case control study and subsequent isolation of
the outbreak strain in the product.
We also found a strong association between illness and
consumption of beefburger at a fast food restaurant chain.
The burgers were produced in the same facility as the ini-
tially suspected minced beef. The first case-control study
that implicated minced beef from producer A included
only six cases. Due to the emergency of the outbreak, these
cases were used for both generating and testing the
hypotheses, which might have introduced an information
Table 1: Results of case-control study of causes of E. coli O103 outbreak in Norway, January-March 2006. The matched analysis includes 
15 cases and 45 controls.
Food consumed No. of cases (%) No. of controls 
(%)
mOR 95% confidence 
interval
p-value Adjusted mOR 95% confidence 
interval
p-value
Cured sausage 
("morrpølse")
9/14 (64) 6/45 (13) 19.4 (2.4 – 156) 0.005 17.6 (1.6 – 187) 0.018
Beefburger at 
fastfood chain B*
7/15 (47) 5/45 (11) 14.7 (1.7 – 123) 0.014 12.5 (0.9 – 181) 0.065
Minced beef from 
producer A
10/14 (71) 20/44 (45) 2.7 (0.8 – 9.5) 0.124
Lean pork patties 8/14 (57) 9/44 (20) 5.1 (1.3 – 20.4) 0.023
* Received raw beef patties from producer A
Table 2: Evidence of E.coli O103 infection in HUS cases (10) and diarrhoeal cases (6) and asymptomatic case (1), January-March 2006 
(n = 17)
Diarrhoea/bloody 
diarrhoea
HUS Stool culture for 
E.coli O103
eae-gene stx1/stx2 MLVA outbreak 
profile *
Antibody titre against 
outbreak strain**
IgG/IgM Immunoblot 
E.coli O103
1 +/+ + + + -/- + 320 +/+
2 +/+ + + + -/+ + - -/+
3 +/+ + - NA NA NA 160 +/+
4 +/+ + - NA NA NA 320 +/+
5 +/+ + - NA NA NA 320 +/+
6 +/+ + - NA NA NA 640 NT
7 +/+ + - NA NA NA 640 +/+
8 +/- + - NA NA NA - -/-***
9 +/+ + + + -/+ + NA +/+
10 +/+ + + + -/- + NA NT
11 +/+ - + + -/- + NA NT
12 +/+ - + + -/- + NA NT
13 +/+ - + + -/- + NA NT
14 +/+ - + + -/- + NA NT
15 +/+ - + + -/- + NA NT
16 +/- - + + -/- + NA NT
17 -/- - + + -/- + NA NT
* MLVA profile 07-03-00-05-00-07-01 [6].
** The Widal test was performed against the isolate of case no. 2 defined as the outbreak strain
*** Also tested against serotype O157.
Test results: IgG-/IgM + NT: not tested, NA: not available.BMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:41 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/41
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bias. Later in the investigation, after the suspicion about
minced beef was announced, there were many reports
about the "burger-bug" in the media. We believe that
recall bias may have caused the association with beefbur-
gers from chain B in the second larger case-control study.
Long after the product had been withdrawn, it was discov-
ered through immunoblot analysis that one case (no 8,
table 2) probably was infected by another E. coli than the
outbreak strain, and thus was proably not related to the
outbreak. We have still presented the analysis including
this case (table 1) because it fulfilled the case definition
used during ther investigation, and it was this analysis that
formed the basis for decision making at the time. This
illustrates the dillemma of choosing between a sensitive
and a specific case definition during an outbreak investi-
gation.
This investigation illustrates that even when it is consid-
ered necessary to warn customers about suspected prod-
ucts early in the investigation, it is important to continue
investigating alternative sources vigorously until the
source can be confirmed and no more cases occurs after
the source is removed.
Genotyping of the isolates was pursued using a recently
published MLVA assay, which is designed for differentia-
tion within all E. coli serotypes [6]. MLVA is generally con-
sidered to be a robust and fast typing method with high
discriminatory power [6,11]. Prospective MLVA subtyping
of STEC may be used to detect clusters of related cases and
ascertain the source of infection. The high discriminatory
power of the MLVA method for O103 as well as for E. coli
in general, has been documented by Lindstedt et al. [6].
The outbreak was detected by clinicians reporting a cluster
of HUS cases, and not by an increase in laboratory verified
E. coli O103 infections. The same has been the case in a
few other reported STEC outbreaks; one STEC O111 out-
break in Australia [12], some German STEC O157 (sorbi-
tol-fermenting) outbreaks [13,14] and two Italian HUS
outbreaks involving non-O157 strains [15,16]. Most of
these outbreaks would have been missed by screening fae-
cal samples using sorbitol MacConkey's (SMAC) agar as
this medium is intended for the detection of of sorbitol-
negative O157 strains. Underreporting of non-O157 E.
coli strains is assumed due to the current laboratory meth-
ods used in many countries [2,16], including Norway.
Therefore, surveillance of diarrhoea-associated HUS may
be needed for early detection of STEC outbreaks [17].
STEC O103:H2 is one of the most frequently isolated
non-O157 serotypes in many European countries and can
cause severe illnesses comparable to those caused by sero-
group O157 [18]. It was first identified as a causative
agent of HUS in 1992 [19], however cases are mainly spo-
radic and outbreaks of STEC O103:H2 have rarely been
reported. One family outbreak was reported in Japan [20]
and one day-care centre outbreak in Argentina [21], both
caused by stx1-positive STEC O103. The sources were not
identified. The serotype of the present outbreak –
O103:H25 – is extremely rare. A few sporadic cases have
been reported [22,23], and where the toxin profile has
been reported, all have been stx1-positive. Outbreaks or
sporadic cases caused by stx2 positive E. coli O103:H25
have to our knowledge never previously been identified.
More than half the patients developed HUS. In spite of
widespread testing of contacts and enhanced laboratory
procedures during the outbreak, very few additional mild
cases were identified. Only one family member of a HUS
case reported symptoms. An increase in non-outbreak
related STEC infections in patients with milder symptoms
were reported, which could indicate that the sensitivity of
testing improved during and after the outbreak. Thus, we
believe that the outbreak strain was particularly virulent.
Also in some other outbreaks, a similar high proportion of
HUS cases have been observed [13,14,24]. STEC strains,
independent of serogroup, that contain the eae gene and
produce Stx2 are much more likely to cause severe disease
and HUS than are those that produce Stx1 [25-27]. In
addition, sequencing of the stx2 operon showed that it
encoded a Stx2 variant that is more often associated with
HUS than other subtypes [9]. The reason why stx-genes
could be demonstrated in only two of the outbreak iso-
lates, despite the fact that the isolates were closely related
genetically, will be the subject further research. Bielasze-
wska et al studied patients with HUS hospitalized in Aus-
tria and Germany, and found that at the time of
microbiological analysis, 5% of HUS patients shed no
longer the causative STEC, but excreted stx-negative deriv-
atives that had lost stx during infection [28]. Other studies
have also shown that STEC may loose the stx-genes during
infection or subcultivation [29-32].
A Danish study found that serogroups O157 and O103
were independent risk factors for bloody diarrhoea [33].
Earlier reports have suggested that E. coli O103:H2, can be
regarded as an emerging foodborne pathogen [34] and
warned that additional uptake of stx2-phages by E. coli
O103 can result in the emergence of a strain with
increased virulence as has occurred with E. coli O26
[18,34].
The two cases diagnosed with E. coli O103:H25 with the
same MLVA- and virulence profile in 2003 and 2005 may
indicate that this strain has been present over a longer
time period in Norway. However, it is not known if these
cases were related to cured sausage or other products con-
taining mutton. Earlier reports have shown that Norwe-BMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:41 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2334/8/41
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gian sheep may carry human-pathogenic STEC [35],
including STEC O103 [36]. Mutton products were
recently associated with an outbreak of STEC O26 in
France [37].
Fecal contamination of carcasses is practically unavoida-
ble, and STEC are able to survive the fermentation, drying,
and storage stages of sausage production [38], as shown in
experimental studies [39-41]. Several STEC outbreaks
caused by dry fermented sausages have been described
[12,42-45]. These products are often made of combina-
tions of meat mixed with spices and curing materials that
then undergo fermentation and drying. In general, it is
believed that short ripening time may lead to incomplete
fermentation and thus to conditions (e.g. pH) that still
allows growth or survival of enteric pathogens. Since these
sausages are eaten raw and the infectious dose for STEC is
very low, the producer must assure microbiologically
safety. The products are believed to constitute a 'medium'
risk hazard for STEC infection [39,46,47], and the US
Food Safety and Inspection Service has developed guide-
lines [48] for sausage manufacturers to validate processes
to ensure a 5 log10 unit (5D) reduction in counts of STEC
O157:H7, for instance by heating the final product. Still,
we believe that the consumers should be made aware of
the inherent risk associated with these products [46].
We do not know why STEC survived the curing process in
the incriminated "morrpølse". An evaluation committee
suggested that there should be stricter requirement on
hygienic quality for raw meat used for such products. In
addition, the producer should document the effectiveness
of the production process in reducing the level of patho-
gens if present in raw meat or other ingredients.
Conclusion
In summary, we report an outbreak of infections with a
rare strain of STEC (O103:H25, stx2-positive). More than
half of the diagnosed patients developed HUS, indicating
that the causative organism is particularly virulent. The
source of the outbreak was cured sausages produced in
one processing plant. The outbreak created a huge media
attention, raised concerns about food safety and had large
economical consequences for the producer. The potential
for future outbreaks warrants a re-evaluation of the micro-
biologic health-hazards in the production of cured meat
sausages.
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